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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, 
City University London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue 
focussed leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and 
other key market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh 
insights into the world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use 
MARC for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to 
closing, from financing to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board 
rooms of the biggest corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, 
acquisitions and corporate restructurings. 
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Overview
ince 2010 there has been an incredible 
inflow of capital to hedge funds that 
focus specifically on activist investing. 
The aggressive and often hostile 
actions of activist funds have created negative 
publicity and an increased focus on the 
shortened holding period of these investors. But 
are activists a blessing or a curse?  
This report, produced by the M&A Research 
Centre (MARC) at Cass Business School 
provides an insight into the short- and long-term 
performance effects of activist campaigns in the 
United States, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom since the financial crisis. 
This report should not be considered as a guide 
for activist investors on what tactics to use or a 
guide for company executives on what they 
should be prepared for. It rather highlights 
important patterns in the outcomes of 
shareholder activism in the United States, 
Germany, and United Kingdom since the 
beginning of 2010, when the economies of 
these countries were emerging from the depths 
of the financial crisis. 
Activism tends to be concentrated largely in the 
United States, but the expectations for further 
expansion into Europe make it important to 
understand its existing environment and what 
activist methods have had success in the 
region. As equity markets reach new heights in 
Europe, there will be new opportunities for 
activist investors. 
Highlights of this report:  
 The findings show that in Germany 
the reaction to activist actions is 
generally negative, in contrast to the 
United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK) where long-term 
performance does show 
outperformance in some cases.   
 
 In the United States, activism related to 
Mergers & Acquisition is shown to be 
successful. US activists that take short 
positions tend to perform poorly. In both 
the UK and Germany the results 
indicate that returns improve 
considerably when the full length of 
investments is taken into account.   
 
 Activists hold their investments in 
each jurisdiction for more than one 
year, and in the UK and Germany, 
holding periods typically exceed 1.5 
years.  These results call into question the 
accusations that activists are only looking 
for short-term gains without consideration 
of the long-term health of a company.  
 
 Based on the length of the activist 
investments studied, both current and 
exited, the data indicates that fears of 
short-termism may be overblown.  
When compared with average equity 
holding periods the evidence does not 
suggest that activists take a shorter view 
than typical investors. 
 
 The low activity and relatively poor 
performance in Germany suggests 
that it is the least receptive market 
for activists when compared to the 
US and UK.  
 
 The evidence shows that activists could 
take a more prominent role in the UK  
but there is always the possibility that 
returns will suffer if more activists pile in.  
 
 The United States is the undisputed 
leader of shareholder activism  but 
despite its commonality, the performance 
from investors shows that finding the right 
approach remains challenging. 
S 
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Is Activist Investment Equivalent to Short 
Termism?
he idea that activism is representative of 
“short-termism” is one that is up for 
debate. Data from various sources 
indicates that declining holding periods for 
equities is decades in the making and not a 
recent phenomenon to be blamed on 
shareholder activism. Despite research touting 
the benefits of long-term share ownership, the 
holding period on the NYSE, LSE, and 
Deutsche Börse has been less than two years 
for at least the past two decades, as presented 
in Figure 1 below. 
In many cases activists are criticized not 
regarding the length of engagement, but for 
their tactics. In particular, many are critical 
about the use of buybacks or special dividends 
to reward shareholders. It is argued that this 
type of outcome fails to consider the 
ramifications of the lack of capital investment 
and the impact this will eventually have on 
future growth. Special dividends and share 
buybacks can also results in artificially boosted 
share prices and stock-based compensation for 
executive1.  
The solution to the perceived problem is hard to 
determine. Frequent critic of short-termism 
Harvard Business Review, puts the challenge 
to institutional investors to be good corporate 
stewards and make sure strategy is aligned for 
the long-term.2 However, as pointed out in its 
2014 review of activism, some of the largest, 
most powerful institutional investors are 
increasingly backing activists in their 
campaigns for change. 3  At the height of the 
2007 pre-crisis activism boom evidence 
showed simply that open dialogue and focus on 
improving performance led to the best 
outcomes.4
 
Figure 1 – Average holding period for global equity exchanges  
(Source: World Federation of Exchanges, 2015)
                                                          
1 Lazonick, W., 2012. In the Name of Shareholder 
Value: How Executive Pay and Stock Buybacks are 
Damaging the US Economy. In Clarke, T. & Branson, 
D. The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance. 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. pp.476-96. 
2 Barton, D. & Marc, W., 2014. Focusing Capital on 
the Long Term. Harvard Business Review, January-
February(1), p.8 
3 Activist Insight, 2015. Activist Investing - An annual 
review of trends in shareholder activism. Research. 
London: Activist Insight. 
4 MacGregor, J. & Campbell, I., 2007. Dealing with 
investor activism: Investors seek cash returns from 
pushing your buttons - There are things you can to 
do to prepare for an attack. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Government, 5(1), pp.23-35 
T 
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Investing Landscape Across Different 
Geographies
f the myriad challenges investors face 
in looking for opportunities is the 
different regulatory environment of 
each country. While legislative changes over 
the past two decades have brought more 
continuity, subtle nuances still exist between 
most major equity markets. Understanding the 
investing environment is critical for investors 
and provides insight into the likelihood and 
outcome of activist engagements. Comparing 
the likes of the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Germany it is possible to contrast how even 
slight differences in the regulatory frameworks 
play an important role in determining how 
activism is approached. The working paper 
from Becht Franks and Grant provides a useful 
guide to the current environment, and is used 
as the baseline for this comparison. 5  Where 
relevant, this report examines any updates or 
proposed changes in the selected countries.  
Included among the most important tools in an 
activist’s arsenal are the ability to remove 
directors, nominate new directors or entire 
boards, call shareholder meetings, make 
proposals, and act in concert with other 
shareholders. Along the way investors must 
take into account reporting requirements and 
be vigilant about the disclosures it makes. This 
is where things begin to diverge for investors 
looking at opportunities in different 
geographies. For instance, the United States 
uses plurality voting in board elections, 
meaning certain directors can still be elected 
with less than 50% approval (including 
abstentions). The UK and Germany use a 
simple majority. However, when it comes to 
removing a director before the end of their 
tenure Germany joins the US in mandating that 
                                                          
5 Becht, M., Franks, J., Grant, J. & Wagner, H., 2014. 
The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study. European Corporate 
Governance Institute. Working Paper. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
a director can only be removed “for cause,” and 
Germany goes one step further by requiring a 
supermajority vote. Shareholders in the UK 
need only a simple majority and can remove 
directors without cause.6  
Interestingly, despite the prevalence of activism 
in the US, it is perhaps the most difficult 
environment for any investors to actually have 
proposals voted upon. Shareholders have no 
legal right to call an extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM), unlike each of the other four. In 
2009 the ownership threshold for calling an 
EGM in the UK rose from 5% to 10%, while in 
Germany it is 5%. In addition, even if proposals 
from shareholders make it to a vote in the US, 
the results are only advisory. In the UK and 
Germany all shareholder proposals are 
binding. 7  This might help explain why 
shareholder proposals in these countries often 
do not pass. Where each of these countries 
shares commonality is in the cost of proxy 
solicitation, which is carried by the shareholder. 
This is important, as it is estimated to cost 
anywhere between $200,000 and $1m by 
advisory firm Georgeson.8 Lastly, it is important 
to note what preventative measures companies 
can implement, through control-enhancing 
mechanisms, shareholder rights plans, and 
mandatory bid rules. In the US investors are 
more likely to encounter poison pills, the use of 
which has been declared legal by their 
respective court systems under legal 
challenges within the past ten years. 
Meanwhile, in the UK and Germany investors 
must take note of mandatory bid rules. Set at 
8  Kumar, R., 2014. 2014 Annual Corporate 
Governance Review. Research. New York: 
Georgeson Georgeson. 
http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Pages/acgr.
aspx. 
O 
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30% in the UK 9  and Germany 10  any 
shareholder exceeding these levels must 
propose a full acquisition. 
Yet little in the world of investing often stays the 
same for very long. In 2010, with the passage 
of the Dodd-Frank legislation in the United 
States, formally known as the Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, originally 
included a mandate for universal ballots. This 
would force companies to include all 
shareholder proposals on a single ballot, 
potentially saving millions for activists. 
However, the legality of this measure was 
challenged and overturned. After years of 
voicing their displeasure the tide may be turning 
back in activists’ favour, as the Chairwoman of 
the SEC Mary Jo White voiced support of 
universal ballots and it will be voted on by the 
regulator’s five commissioners and with a 
majority will pass. 11  Separately in France in 
2014, the government passed what has 
become known as the Florange Law. The law 
forces all public companies listed in France to 
reward long-term shareholders, those owning 
shares for over two years, with double voting 
rights.12 Following France’s lead, legislation is 
currently working its way through European 
Commission regulatory bodies that would apply 
to all companies in the EU.13 While companies 
can, and have, changed their by-laws to 
maintain one-share, one-vote rules, it does give 
considerable power to large shareholders of 
public companies, and thus the opposite for 
activists seeking to build stakes and make 
changes. 
 
                                                          
9 The Takeover Panel, 2015. The Takeover Code. 
Regulatory. London: RR Donnelly The Takeover 
Panel. 
10  Korsch, H.S. & Eichwald, D., 2014. Germany 
Takeover Guide. Regulatory. Mutze Korsch 
Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH. 
11 Ackerman, A. & Benoit, D., 2015. SEC Chief Tilts 
Again to Activists. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chief-calls-for-new-
corporate-ballot-rules-1435240995 [Accessed 26 
June 2015]. 
12 Strothard, M., 2015. French companies fight back 
against Florange double-vote law. [Online] Available 
Equity Markets in the United States, 
Germany, and United Kingdom 
It is necessary to evaluate the marketplace 
within which the shares of targets of activist 
campaigns are traded. Activism tends to be 
more prevalent in the equity markets of the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ), totalling approximately 
$27 trillion compared to the Deutsche Börse 
where activism accounts for slightly more than 
$1.8 trillion. Meanwhile, despite the London 
Stock Exchange including over 2,700 listed 
entities, more than the NYSE and only slightly 
less than the NASDAQ, its total market 
capitalization is approximately $4.3 trillion, 
about 56% of the NASDAQ and 22% of the 
NYSE. 14  Proportionally, the number of 
companies subject to an activist campaign is 
also larger in the US (20% of US listed 
companies are the subject of an activist 
campaigns), than in the UK (5% of UK listed 
companies are the subject of an activist 
campaigns) and Germany (3% of German listed 
companies are the subject of an activist 
campaigns). 
Figure 2 below highlight the differences 
between the US, UK, and German equity 
markets and make clear that investors are 
operating in a much larger universe in the 
United States. There have been activist 
campaigns against more NYSE and NASDAQ-
listed companies in the United States (1,060) 
than there are listed companies on the entire 
Deutsche Börse (647). Yet it is clear that size is 
not the only factor at work, for if it were, then 
proportionally the number of companies subject 
to an activist campaign would be equal. 
at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05314dfe-e27d-11e4-
ba33-00144feab7de.html#axzz3jLkPQ1At 
[Accessed 28 June 2015]. 
13 EurActiv, 2015. EU lawmakers back rewards for 
long-term shareholders. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/eu-
lawmakers-back-rewards-long-term-shareholders-
314439 [Accessed 28 June 2015]. 
14 World Federation of Exchanges, 2015. Statistics. 
[Online] Available at: http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics 
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However, approximately 20% of US-listed 
companies have been subject to an activist 
campaign since 2010 that figure drops to less 
than 5% in the UK and less than 3% in 
Germany.  
Figure 2: Market Capitalisation per 
exchange (Source: World Federation 
of Exchanges, 2015) 
 
A Closer Look at Germany 
The stakeholder model that characterizes 
Germany’s corporate culture has several 
important distinctions between it and the 
models favoured in the US and UK. Ownership 
has long been characterised by large 
blockholders including banks, insurance 
companies, industrials, and families, often in a 
complex web of cross-shareholdings. Two-tier 
boards include far more stakeholder 
representation in Germany than its Anglo-
American counterparts. Codetermination 
requirements give employees a say in the 
management of their companies, while banks 
have long had a seat on supervisory boards. 
Even in light of several efforts to invigorate 
                                                          
15  Sudarsanam, S. & Broadhurst, T., 2012. 
Corporate governance convergence in Germany 
through shareholder activism: Impact of the 
Deutchse Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 16(2), 
pp.235-68. 
16 Strätling, R., 2012. How to overcome sharheolder 
apathy in corporate governance - the role of investor 
associations in Germany. Annals of Public & 
Cooperative Economics, 83(2), pp.143-57. 
17 Weber, A., 2009. An empirical analysis of the 2000 
corporate tax reform in Germany: Effects on 
public equity markets through legislative efforts 
there is scant evidence to suggest Germany will 
move towards a more shareholder-focused 
model in the near future, given that it would like 
face stiff government and labour union 
opposition. 15  Thus the deck remains stacked 
against activists looking towards Germany.  
Two notable changes to the German landscape 
occurred in 1998 and 2000, with the passing of 
Control and Transparency in Business Act 
(KonTraG) and reforms to corporate tax law in 
2000. Introduction of KonTraG not only helped 
reduce cross-shareholdings through 
restrictions on voting rights but also helped give 
rise to retail investor proxy associations, which 
typically held long-term interests and had fewer 
conflicts of interest. 16  Meanwhile, the tax 
reforms enacted in 2000 abolished corporate 
income tax for companies liquidating long-term 
shareholdings, which was shown to have a 
drastic downward effect on the number and 
average size of large block shareholdings and 
cross-shareholdings, particularly in the financial 
sector. 17  The above mentioned regulatory 
changes changes gave more power to minority 
shareholders and attracted more foreign 
capital. 18  However, despite ownership 
concentrations coming down since 2000, the 
necessary market conditions for challenging 
corporate control are still far from prevalent in 
Germany. An analysis of shareholder 
engagement from 2008 to 2010 indicated that 
40% of countermotions to board proposals 
came from retail proxy associations, while just 
2% originated with institutions. 19  Additional 
studies on activism in Europe supported the 
hypothesis that high ownership concentration 
had a negative correlation to shareholder 
activism.20  In situations when proposals from 
ownership and control in listed companies. 
International Review of Law & Economics, 29(1), 
pp.57-66. 
18 Ibid. 
19  Schaefer, H. & Hertrich, C., 2013. Shareholder 
Activism in Germany: An Empirical Study. IUP 
Journal of Corporate Governance, 12(2), pp.28-39. 
20  Judge, W., Gaur, A. & Muller-Kahle, M., 2010. 
Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target 
Firms: Evidence from a Multi-Country Study. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
18(4), pp.258-73. 
0
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activists are voted on at AGMs there is seen to 
be a negative effect on share prices attributed 
to the significance these matters indicate in 
Continental Europe, attributable to proposals 
legally binding nature and a far cry from their 
use (or overuse) in the US.21  
The famous recent example of shareholder 
activism influencing management strategy from 
the failed Deutsche Börse-London Stock 
Exchange merger shows how German firms 
with dispersed ownership are more at risk.22 
However, in general, the evidence is against 
hedge funds and private equity firms being able 
to force management changes at German 
firms, and in the case of hedge funds it’s 
actually the opposite.23 In fact, implementation 
of the Risk Limitation Act in 2012 makes it 
increasingly difficult for activists to implement 
their plans, adding to previous disclosure 
requirements. Shareholders exceeding 10% 
must declare their intentions within 20 days, 
which follows US and French norms. In 
addition, the changes widen the scope for what 
German regulators consider to be shareholders 
“acting in concert” to push a specific agenda. 
Not only must coordinated efforts be disclosed, 
but also closely monitored to determine 
whether combined holdings breach 30%, which 
would trigger a mandatory takeover offer. This 
is a potential explanation for increased activism 
through litigation following merger 
announcements, pushing for higher transaction 
premiums as opposed to waging lengthy 
campaigns.24 
Activist Targets based on Size and 
Sector 
A global breakdown of campaigns since the 
beginning of 2010 through June 2015 based on 
                                                          
Sauerwald, S., Van Essen, M. & Van Oosterhout, H., 
2013. Sharheolder Activism in Europe: Evidence 
from Shareholder Dissent in France, Germany, and 
the UK. Journal of Corporate Governance, pp.552-
57. 
21 Cziraki, P., Renneboog, L. & Szilagyi, P., 2010. 
Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The 
European Perspective. European Financial 
Management, 16(5), pp.738-77. 
22  Sudarsanam, S. & Broadhurst, T., 2012. 
Corporate governance convergence in Germany 
through shareholder activism: Impact of the 
market capitalization is presented in Figure 3. 
The data is broken down into five categories 
from Nano-cap as the smallest to large cap at 
the top of the range. Nano-cap companies are 
those that were under $50m in market 
capitalization at the time of engagement, with 
micro-cap from $50-250m, small cap from 
$250m to $2bn, mid-cap from $2bn to $10bn 
and large cap including any target with a market 
capitalization above $10bn. The information 
provides insights into the typical size targets in 
which activists are taking positions during a 
given year. Given the expected returns from 
companies of different sizes – typically small 
cap companies can product larger returns on a 
per cent basis – this is important to evaluate. 
With the exception of 2011, when micro-cap 
targets slightly exceeded them, small cap 
companies have been the most targeted. On a 
per cent basis, about 25% of engagements 
each year target small cap companies, while 
micro-cap is nearer to 20% per year. The most 
significant changes are at each end of the 
spectrum, with Nano-caps being targeted far 
less dropping from almost 20% in 2010 to 
barely above 10% in 2015.   
Figure 4 shows the sector categories that have 
been targeted since 2010, providing insight into 
where activists have been focusing their efforts. 
Companies operating in the Services, 
Financial, and Technology sectors have been 
the most heavily targeted each year since 2010 
accounting for at least 57% of investments in 
each year and in total representing over 60% of 
all investments. 
Deutchse Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 16(2), 
pp.235-68. 
23 Voubem, B., Schäffer, U. & Schweizer, D., 2014. 
Top management turnover under the influence of 
activist investors. Journal of Management and 
Governance, 19(3), pp.709-39. 
24  Besse, D. & Heuser, M., 2014. Shareholder 
Activism in Germany Following a Takeover 
Announcement. Attorney Advertising, 27 May. pp.1-
3. 
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Figure 3: Activist Actions by Market Cap since 2010 
(Source: Activist Insight, 2015)25 
 
 
Figure 4: Activist Actions by Sector  
(Source: Activist Insight, 2015) 
 
                                                          
25 Activist Insight, 2015. Public Action Report. [Spreadsheet] London: Activist Insight Available at: 
www.activistinsight.com. 
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Performance Implications of Activist 
Actions 
Short-term Reaction in the United 
States  
This section of the report focuses on the 
analysis of short-term market reaction to the 
announcements of activist campaigns. 26  The 
data results are broken down to show the ten-
day pre-event returns (i.e. before the 
announcement of a given campaign), event day 
returns (i.e. on the day of campaign 
announcement), and ten-day post-event 
returns (i.e. following the announcement of a 
given campaign). The “Action Date” is used as 
the announcement day.27 
If the data shows that returns on the event day 
and in the post-event ten-day trading window 
are greater than zero it lends support to the 
argument that the market reacts positively to 
activist actions. The reverse is true if the 
abnormal returns are negative.  
The mean return for each period is positive, with 
pre-event returns highest at 2.78%, with mean 
post-event returns of 0.43% and mean event 
day returns of 0.005%. The results also show 
high degrees of volatility. Both the event day 
and post-event returns display characteristics 
of normally distributed data around the mean. 
The pre-event returns show the returns are 
positively skewed. The results are surprising in 
that they show stronger pre-event performance 
than event day or post-event performance. The 
hypothesis that the announcement of a 
campaign generates positive abnormal returns 
is not supported for the full period. These 
                                                          
26  Share prices for the 21-day event study were 
retrieved from Bloomberg databases and matched 
with information from the Activist Insight database. 
27 The “Action Date” is used as the event day, as this 
coincides with the registration of a 13d SEC filing or 
press release by activist investors. The Action Date 
is often not the same as the initial investment date. 
To study event returns that ten days before and after 
the Action date were included in the sample. 
results are the opposite of what was anticipated 
at the start of the study. 
Tables 1 & 2 summarize the data on a year-by-
year basis, showing how market reactions have 
differed. Pre-event returns are the strongest in 
the majority of periods, only bested in 2011 
when the average impact on target share prices 
was negative.28The results on a year-by-year 
basis are consistent with the overall sample 
results, with mean pre-event returns showing 
significant differences in three of five-plus 
years 29 , while mean event day returns are 
different in two years (in one case below the 
mean index return – 2013). There is no 
statistically significant evidence to support a 
presence of abnormal returns following the 
announcements of activist campaigns in any 
year. 
The year-by-year data also does not support 
the original hypothesis strongly, but does show 
that in certain years there was a measurable 
positive abnormal return for target companies. 
The results could indicate that investors are 
hesitant to quickly decide on the merits of an 
activist investment, knowing that resolution 
could be a long way off. It is possible that the 
capital markets are waiting to base their 
decision on additional information being 
presented. 
 
28 To determine whether the difference between the 
mean of the two data sets t-tests were performed 
with reliability levels of 5%. In each case the null 
hypothesis (H0) is that the difference between the 
mean target return and the mean index return is zero. 
The alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that the mean 
target return is not equal to the mean index return. 
Only in the case of pre-event returns is there support 
for rejecting the null hypothesis 
29 Statistically significant. 
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Table 1: US Event Window Returns 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
 
Table 2: US Event Window Abnormal Returns 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
                                                          
30 “AR” represents abnormal returns, the difference between the average returns on the target and average returns 
on the S&P 500 index. 
31 CAR Event+ is a measure of the combined cumulative abnormal returns on the event day and during the post-
event ten-day window. It excludes pre-event returns.  
 
Target Pre-
Event 
Target Event 
Day 
Target Post-
Event 
Market Pre-
Event 
Market Event 
Day 
Market Post-
Event 
2010 1.98% 1.48% 0.98% 0.49% 0.22% 0.69% 
2011 -0.48% -0.29% -0.99% 0.09% -0.08% 0.06% 
2012 4.25% 0.53% -0.26% 0.42% 0.05% 0.47% 
2013 3.69% -0.51% 1.05% 0.99% 0.08% 0.70% 
2014 0.51% -0.05% 0.17% 0.42% 0.11% 0.49% 
2015 7.34% -0.71% 1.47% 0.23% 0.03% 0.14% 
 Pre-Event AR30 Event Day AR Post-Event AR CAR CAR Event+31 
2010 2.00% 1.00% 0.00% 3.00% 2.00% 
2011 -0.56% -0.22% -1.09% -1.87% -1.31% 
2012 3.77% 0.49% -0.73% 3.53% -0.24% 
2013 2.68% -0.59% 0.36% 2.00% 0.00% 
2014 0.07% -0.16% -0.31% -0.40% -0.47% 
2015 7.07% -0.74% 1.34% 7.67% 0.60% 
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Short-term Reaction in the United 
Kingdom 
Activist targets have positive average returns in 
each of the pre-announcement, announcement 
day and post-announcement periods. Notably, 
the UK is the only region in which the average 
target returns exceed the average index returns 
in all three periods. In the pre-announcement 
The average index-adjusted return over the 
entire period (i.e. before, during and after 
campaign announcement) for the activist 
targets is 2.48%, the highest compared to the 
US and Germany. The average index-adjusted 
return for each of the pre-announcement, 
announcement day, and post- announcement 
periods is 1.65%, 0.26%, and 0.56% 
respectively, again the only sample with 
positive mean CARs in each period. 
The results demonstrate that while targets are 
outperforming in the immediate period prior to 
the announcement of an action, they lose this 
momentum once the action is announced. 
Although the expectation that the 
announcement of an activist campaign 
generates abnormal returns is not supported by 
the analysis, it could indicate other conclusions. 
It is possible that fund managers are trying to 
time their actions to align with the positive 
momentum of the targets’ recent performance 
hoping it will continue. 
Short-term Reaction in Germany  
In contrast to the US and the UK, the average 
returns in the ten-day pre-announcement 
trading period for activist targets in Germany is 
-0.99% (negative), while the German Stock 
Index (DAX) average return is 0.52%. On the 
action date activist targets average a positive 
return of 0.50%, a number that is marginally 
above the DAX average return of 0.36%. In the 
ten-day post-announcement trading period 
activist targets reverted to negative average 
returns, in this case -1.36% while the mean 
return from the DAX during the same trading 
period is 1.02%. Compared to the short-term 
market reaction in the United States, the 
variance in the results in Germany is lower and 
trading is within much smaller ranges in each of 
the three periods, before, on, and after the 
announcement of an activist campaign. 
Comparing the average target and index 
returns following the announcement of activist 
campaigns shows that target returns were 
lower than index returns (-2.37%).  
Looking at the cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement of an activist 
campaign for German targets, the results for 
both the entire announcement period as well as 
announcement day plus next ten trading days 
show negative returns. This finding indicates 
that the immediate perception of activist actions 
by the German capital markets is negative. The 
mean abnormal return for the entire 21-day 
event period is -3.69% and the mean abnormal 
return for the period including the 
announcement day and following ten trading 
days is -2.23%. 
The target returns on the date of announcement 
are not significantly different from zero, implying 
that the shares pause their negative momentum 
on the day of the campaign announcement 
before continuing to fall over the next ten days. 
This finding indicates that investors do take 
note of the actions of activists, but these actions 
do not serve to reverse the negative pre-
announcement performance. In this respect 
Germany differs from both United States and 
United Kingdom. The analysis demonstrates 
that shareholder activism is looked upon 
negatively in Germany, which is also reflected 
later in the long-term returns.   
Long-term Performance in the 
United States 
The analysis of the long-term effects of activist 
campaigns in the United States looks at 
investor returns from four perspectives: by 
market capitalization, activist action, company 
response, and campaign outcome.  
The data shows that target firms had an 
average return in the month prior to a given 
announcement of 4.91%. The average buy-
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and-hold abnormal return was 3.53%. 32  To 
evaluate the post- announcement returns to 
targeted firms the one-year period following the 
announcement of an action was examined, 
providing an average target return of 15.03%. 
However, in the matching one year post-action 
period the market also averaged significant 
gains of 15.58%, and therefore the buy-and-
hold abnormal return to investors in activist 
targets was actually negative -0.29%.33 In total, 
only 313 of the 716 events had positive long-
term abnormal returns. The returns were 
measured a final time to determine whether 
there is a difference in outcomes between long 
and short investing (i.e. the position that 
activists take on the target company).  
The results shows that activist investors who 
took a long position gained a mean abnormal 
return of 3.49%, while short activists suffered 
mean losses in year one of -12.90%. 34  This 
finding shows an important distinction between 
the success of long and short activists that 
plays out consistently in the analysis of the 
United States. 
All further long-term analysis was done using 
the performance of returns through the exit date 
or current period. Campaign outcomes in the 
United States are broken down into seven 
categories – Activist Successful, Activist 
Partially Successful, Activist Unsuccessful, 
Compromise/Settlement, Unresolved, 
Withdrew Demands, and Withdrew Board 
Nominations. In total 957 campaigns are 
included in the initial sample. Out of these, 67% 
(643) are either successful or partially 
successful. Activists withdrew their demands or 
board nominations in less than 10% (77) of 
cases, while unsuccessful and unresolved 
campaigns make up the remaining 25% (237) 
of events. The average returns are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 – US Activist Returns by Campaign Outcome 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
Outcome 
No. of 
Investments 
Average 
Follower Return  
Average S&P 
Change  
Average 
BHAR 
Activist Successful 455 37.67 11.69 23.61% 
Activist Unsuccessful 185 36.65 12.35 12.97% 
Compromise/Settlement 99 23.78 11.85 8.55% 
Withdrew Demands 38 21.57 13.87 6.44% 
Unresolved 52 19.46 14.07 4.40% 
Withdrew Board Nominations 39 12.88 9.98 2.67% 
Activist Partially Successful 89 12.92 11.49 0.44% 
                                                          
32 The results were found to be statistically greater 
than zero. 
33 Further testing has shown that results were not 
significantly different from zero. 
34 Both results were found to be statistically greater 
than or less than zero. 
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Of these figures, only the Successful 
campaigns produce long-term returns that are 
statistically greater than zero. If the results are 
run a second time, with the exclusion of 
extreme values from the sample, the returns 
are far lower and no outcome exhibits 
statistically significant results. The second set 
of results makes it clear how much one or two 
extreme values can affect the outcomes. The 
returns to Successful and Unsuccessful 
campaigns drop by more than 20% with just two 
and one campaigns excluded, respectively. 
Moreover, it means that the long-term returns 
for investors are not statistically different from 
zero. While campaigns categorised as 
Compromise/Settlement and Withdrew 
Nominations show clear differences between 
target and index returns, the follower returns for 
both are positively skewed (though not as much 
as the Successful and Unsuccessful campaigns 
including all events), indicating that even 
without extreme values the averages can be 
affected.  
If the presented results are broken down further 
to separate them by industry, the only 
categories that show long-term returns that are 
statistically greater than zero are Healthcare 
(14.44%) and Technology (107.48%/16.43%) in 
Successful campaigns and Technology in 
Unresolved campaigns (27.87%). Basic 
Materials targets are consistent 
underperformers with negative long-term 
returns in all outcomes and returns that are 
statistically less than zero in Successful (-
27.29%), Partially Successful (-23.87%), and 
Compromise/Settlement (-15.93%) situations. 
The only other statistically significant outcome 
is Financial Services targets in Partially 
Successful campaigns with a negative return of 
7.36%. Long-term returns calculated by 
outcome and company size (market 
capitalization) show that positive returns are 
more consistent for Small Cap and Mid Cap 
targets than any other size35. 
Measuring returns by the type of activism an 
investor employs provides a granular look into 
                                                          
35  The results were found to be statistically 
significant. 
the data. The 44 sub-types are condensed into 
eight main categories – Activist Short, Balance 
Sheet, Board-related, Business Strategy, M&A, 
Other Governance, Other, and Remuneration. 
The three most popular categories of activism 
are Board-related (490), Activist Short (277), 
and M&A (272), while Balance Sheet (158) and 
Business Strategy (121) are less popular types 
of activism. The only two categories to deliver 
long-term returns that are different from zero 
are M&A and Activist Short. M&A Activism 
provides abnormal returns of 29.45%. Activist 
Short actions deliver returns of -7.73%, the 
worst of any category.  
The long-term campaign data from the United 
States taken as a whole does not support the 
proposition that activists achieve abnormal 
returns greater than zero, but the analysis of 
various sub-samples shows that in some cases 
it is possible. Importantly, long investors do 
achieve small but significant abnormal returns 
greater than zero in the first year of an 
investment, while short investors receive 
significantly negative abnormal returns. This 
pattern repeats itself when examining the 
returns through the full length of the investment 
or the current period as shown by looking at the 
return based on the type of individual type of 
activism. The figures also support previous 
research that has shown activism surrounding 
M&A has positive abnormal returns. In 
particular, when activists push for the sale of a 
company or a merger they achieve significant 
returns, but other types of M&A activism, such 
as pushing for an acquisition, opposing a 
merger, takeover, or acquisition, and rebuffing 
the terms of a deal, can lead to insignificant or 
negative abnormal returns. 
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Table 4: United States Follower Returns by Outcome & Sector 
(Source: Bloomberg) 
  Successful Partially Successful Unsuccessful Compromise/Settlement Unresolved Withdrew Nominations Withdrew Demands 
Basic Materials -18.02% -12.89% -6.74% -4.84% -4.12% -4.44% 17.59% 
Conglomerates 30.33% N/A 9.32% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Consumer Goods 12.40% 5.24% 14.02% 4.04% 18.46% -10.01% 27.56% 
Financial 14.70% 2.67% 17.43% 23.24% 8.30% 3.67% 11.55% 
Healthcare 27.98% 49.58% 340.38% 60.68% 68.18% 79.66% 61.48% 
Industrial Goods -1.73% 22.11% 14.50% -8.20% 16.90% 5.05% 19.75% 
Services 10.68% 7.14% 6.54% 6.85% 10.95% 5.47% 27.83% 
Technology 129.40% 16.65% 15.83% 58.76% 48.31% 19.66% 19.28% 
Utilities -28.18% N/A 2.70% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average S&P Returns by Outcome & Sector 
  Successful Partially Successful Unsuccessful Compromise/Settlement Unresolved Withdrew Nominations Withdrew Demands 
Basic Materials 11.74% 12.92% 11.11% 11.93% 14.23% 8.79% 21.45% 
Conglomerates 8.18% N/A 17.32% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Consumer Goods 12.52% 10.12% 11.29% 13.75% 13.31% 6.76% 13.92% 
Financial 11.69% 10.64% 10.00% 10.06% 14.03% 7.00% 11.50% 
Healthcare 11.09% 12.05% 27.74% 13.41% 12.45% 11.12% 12.03% 
Industrial Goods 10.78% 15.88% 15.33% 10.59% 13.46% 11.64% 14.35% 
Services 10.82% 9.71% 9.77% 10.38% 12.24% 6.71% 13.74% 
Technology 12.99% 12.48% 11.91% 15.12% 16.35% 15.41% 13.89% 
Utilities 7.77% N/A 14.15% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Average BHAR by Outcome & Sector 
  Successful Partially Successful Unsuccessful Compromise/Settlement Unresolved Withdrew Nominations Withdrew Demands 
Basic Materials -27.29% -23.87% -17.40% -15.93% -18.77% -12.16% -2.99% 
Conglomerates 20.48% N/A -6.82% N/A N/A N/A #VALUE! 
Consumer Goods -0.61% -3.22% 2.72% -8.51% 4.55% -14.82% 11.51% 
Financial 2.38% -7.36% 6.64% 11.79% -10.10% -1.32% 0.19% 
Healthcare 14.44% 30.45% 163.03%/9.24% 37.62% 49.54% 61.97% 44.14% 
Industrial Goods -12.75% 5.43% -0.72% -17.50% 2.18% -5.90% 4.72% 
Services -0.49% -3.32% -3.17% -3.37% -1.69% -2.52% 11.60% 
Technology 107.48%/16.43% 3.54% 4.14% 31.11% 27.87% 3.55% 4.27% 
Utilities -34.30% N/A -10.03% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Long-term Performance in the 
United Kingdom 
In the UK, in the month prior to the 
announcement of activist actions the 
companies had average returns of 3.02%, 
slightly above the FTSE 100 index average 
return of 1.13%. 36  Despite relatively weak 
market index returns in the year following the 
announcement of an activist action at 5.5%, the 
evidence does not support the expectation that 
average target returns are greater than zero. 
Activist targets have a mean return of 12.89% 
in the one year post-action, with a mean return 
of 5.78%. 
The two most popular types of activism in the 
UK are Board Related activism and M&A 
Activism. The mean annualised return to 
activist targets during the investment period 
(where the exit date is available) or at 30 June 
2015 was 21.03%. Meanwhile, the mean FTSE 
100 index return during the same investment 
period was only 0.25%, leading to a mean 
annualised long-term return of 23.63% for 
activist investors. The analysis indicates that 
the difference between average target and 
average index returns is not zero. Testing the 
mean return also indicates it is statistically 
greater than zero. 
In evaluating whether activists generate 
positive abnormal returns the evidence shows 
that time is an important factor. In the first year 
after the announcement of an activist action, 
although the mean buy-and-hold returns are 
over 5%, the statistics do not show that they are 
significantly greater than zero. However, over 
longer time periods, when investments are 
measured to their exit date or the current 
period, the mean buy-and-hold returns increase 
to a point well above the market index. At such 
values the evidence supports the proposition 
that activist campaigns can improve company 
performance over longer time periods. 
                                                          
36  Despite the gap, the average pre-action 
return of 1.95% is not supported to be 
statistically greater than zero. 
Long-term Performance in 
Germany 
Activist campaigns in Germany have pre-action 
returns in the month prior to announcement of 
0.93%. During the same time periods the 
Deutsche Börse (DAX) average return was 
1.26%. The index-adjusted return for the same 
period is found to be 0.57%. The sample of 
activist targets shows a group trading in line 
with the market in the month prior to a given 
campaign. 
The post-action performance tells a different 
story. In the year following the announcement 
of an activist action the firms’ average returns is 
5.65%. During this time the DAX index 
averaged returns of 15.34%. The end result is 
an index-adjusted average target return of -
8.52%. Like the larger sample from the United 
States, more than half of the German 
campaigns have negative post-action returns. 
The majority of actions involved board-related 
activism while several others involved M&A 
activism.  
The average annualised return to German 
activist targets is 11.33%. The average 
annualised index return during the same 
investment periods is 13%. Comparing the two 
means indicates the difference between the two 
is not significantly different from zero. The 
index-adjusted return is -1.60%. Compared to 
the two other regions, the activist targets exhibit 
narrower trading ranges and a lower return in 
Germany. However, given the total sample size 
for campaigns against German companies, it 
makes it more difficult to draw comparisons 
between the three. In the case of Germany it is 
not possible to show that campaign returns are 
statistically greater than or less than zero, 
therefore the suggestion that activists can 
generate abnormal returns is not supported. 
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Table 5: Germany Annualised Follower Returns 
 (Source: Bloomberg)
Company 
Price at 
Action 
Price at 
6/30/2015 or 
Exit Date 
Trading 
Days 
Market Price at 
Action 
Target 
Gain 
Market Gain 
Target 
Return 
DAX 
Return 
Trading Period 
(Years) 
BHAR 
KHD Humboldt Wedag 
International AG 
6.63 2.60 1010 7163 -60.79% 52.79% -21.02% 11.28% 3.97 -29.03% 
Balda AG 4.84 2.40 871 6354 -50.36% 72.24% -18.51% 17.23% 3.42 -30.49% 
Commerzbank 1.72 11.47 813 6675 568.51% 63.98% 81.30% 16.75% 3.19 55.29% 
Bilfinger Berger 81.57 33.93 581 7984 -58.41% 37.08% -31.92% 14.82% 2.28 -40.71% 
Yoc AG 5.16 2.50 522 7914 -51.63% 38.30% -29.83% 17.14% 2.05 -40.09% 
GSW Immobilien AG 32.99 57.00 536 8370 72.78% 30.77% 29.66% 13.59% 2.11 14.15% 
Kabel Deutschland – M&A 85.10 120.00 453 8447 41.01% 29.58% 21.31% 15.68% 1.78 4.87% 
Lanxess 51.96 52.89 449 8613 1.79% 27.08% 1.01% 14.55% 1.76 -11.82% 
Celesio – M&A  23.35 24.97 54 9300 6.94% 3.19% 37.20% 15.97% 0.21 18.31% 
ThyssenKrupp 17.47 23.34 390 9172 33.57% 19.32% 20.80% 12.23% 1.53 7.64% 
Wacker Neuson 12.35 18.80 325 9056 52.23% 20.85% 38.98% 16.00% 1.28 19.82% 
SMT Scharf 19.45 16.00 308 9587 -17.74% 14.16% -14.91% 11.57% 1.21 -23.73% 
Koenig & Bauer AG 11.8 20.22 296 9402 71.31% 16.42% 58.89% 13.97% 1.16 39.42% 
Sky Deutschland – M&A 6.97 6.43 133 9702 -7.73% -4.68% -14.28% -8.76% 0.52 -6.05% 
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Data and Methodology
he aim of this report was to evaluate the 
effects on publicly traded companies 
that were targeted by shareholder 
activists. The methodology for doing so 
included a short-term event study and a long-
term evaluation of buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns to investors. To achieve that, a list of 
public targets has been compiled that dates 
from 2010 to the present, which reflects 
activism in the post-financial crisis world. In 
addition, a review of the activists themselves is 
conducted. The number of engagements, 
tactics used, and success rates (by campaign) 
has been reviewed as well as returns to 
followers. In addition to returns, data is 
collected for individual targets in comparison to 
the most commonly used or appropriate index 
in order to study short-term event windows.  
When performing an event window study, the 
goal was the look at the effect of a singular 
event in a short time frame. Starting with the 
identification of an event, a period of time 
(usually one or several days) was chosen to 
identify changes in behaviour as a result of the 
event. This was repeated for United States, 
Germany and United Kingdom, in order to be 
able compare and contrast the data between 
the regions.  
To evaluate event window data, the results are 
broken down to show the ten-day pre-event 
returns, event day returns, and ten-day post-
event returns. The “Action Date” is used as the 
event day, as this coincides with the registration 
of a 13d SEC filing or press release by activist 
investors. The Action Date is often not the same 
as the initial investment date. To study event 
returns that ten days before and after the Action 
date were included in the sample. The 
hypotheses being tested are that event returns 
and the post-event returns are significantly 
different, either greater than or less than, zero 
when measured against the market index. 
The second section of data corresponding to 
activist campaigns in three countries looks at 
follower returns from five perspectives: by 
campaign outcome, market capitalization, 
activist action, company response, and 
campaign outcome. The initial list of activist 
actions has been collected from Activist 
Insight’s database of actions from 2010 to 30 
June 2015. For the consistency of analysis, 
only companies from NYSE, NASDAQ, 
Deutsche Boerse and LSE were included. The 
sample sizes were 716, 45 and activist 
campaigns for US, United Kingdom and 
Germany respectively. 
While measuring and comparing short term and 
long term returns on stock in the three 
mentioned countries, two main methods were 
selected: BHAR and CAR. 
These models rely on calculating and 
comparing sample mean return and cumulative 
mean of abnormal returns in accordance of 
event timing. To increase the accuracy and 
ensure the reliability of the study, daily asset 
return data has been used rather than monthly 
and the results have been tested using 
statistical significance (in most cases, 
hypothesis testing and p-value). This is 
particularly important for evaluating long-term 
returns on stock. 
BHAR models were used to evaluate the long 
term performance of the stock. These models 
typically compare returns for a company or 
portfolio against the expected returns for a 
matched company or portfolio of companies. 
The most commonly used comparative metrics 
are size and book-to-market ration. Ever since 
being championed by Benjamin Graham, using 
company size (market capitalization) and book-
to-market equity ratio have been popular 
metrics for predicting stock returns.
T 
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